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THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS:
THE UNITED STATES AS FIFTY-THIRD HOSTAGE?
Introduction

Medieval custom and, later, political theory held that a sovereign's legal
authority was absolute and that it was immune from suit within its borders.
Foreign sovereign immunity evolved as a doctrine of the courts in the
nineteenth century. The courts of one state would exempt from their
jurisdiction a foreign sovereign and its agents in order to prevent conflicts
between rulers over small matters. This exemption was absolute for the
majority of nations well into the twentieth century. The Soviet Union still
claims sovereign immunity for all activities of the state.'
As the diversity of forms of government and the extent of government
involvement in various forms of commercial activity increased, there arose
the problem of how to limit the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity to
provide relief to claimants due to commercial activities of the foreign
sovereign. The restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity distinguishes
between political acts of the foreign sovereign (jure imperii) and commercial
activities (juregestionis). Immunity under the restrictive theory is limited to
political activities. Commercial activities are not covered.2
In the United States, the courts have historically deferred to the
Executive Department as having the constitutional power to conduct foreign
affairs.3 If the State Department suggested to the court that the defendant
was an agent of a foreign sovereign acting in an official capacity, the court
would invariably decline to exercise jurisdiction.4 Invariably, there was
pressure on the State Department by a defendant to have himself declared to
be under foreign sovereign immunity, and by the plaintiff for the opposite
result.
The practice of having the State Department determine whether
immunity was appropriate was inherently political and was much criticized.'
Supporters of the practice emphasized the need for the State Department to
maintain flexibility in the conduct of foreign relations.6 The State Depart1. Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in CommercialActivities, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 1086 (1965).

2. Id.
3. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1947).
4. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
5. Immunities of Foreign States: HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Claims and
Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary on R.R. 3493, 93rd
Congress, 1st Session (1973), at 14.
6. Id. at 34 and 61; Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State DepartmentSuggestions:
Recognition of Prerogatives of Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNEI L. Q. 461 (1963).
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ment cooperated in the drafting of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA)7 since foreign states would be inclined to regard a decision by the
State Department refusing to suggest immunity as a political decision
unfavorable to them, rather than as a legal decision.' The FSIA codified the
restrictive theory and gave the courts guidelines for determination of the
issues of foreign sovereign immunity and of related issues of attachment of
property wholely within the courts' jurisdiction.' Other nations have passed
similar laws and adopted similar conventions.'"
During the Iran Hostage Crisis, the courts found themselves interpreting
this new statute under extraordinary conditions. The large losses of United
States commercial interests engaged in business with the Shah's government
or with companies nationalized by the successor regime led to the filing of
approximately 400 suits against the Iranian government in United States
district courts." The United States Government has identified an additional
3,000 companies or individuals who have additional claims pending, though
not in court. 2 Several opinions arising from those 400 cases will be discussed
in order to illustrate some of the problems of interpreting the FSIA in light of
the Iranian Crisis. This note will focus upon the predominant issue of
pre-judgment attachment of Iranian assets and will address the court
opinions in chronological order.
The Behring Case
Behring International, Inc. was under contract to Iran as an international freight forwarding agency. Goods from various sellers in the United States

7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (Oct. 21, 1976).
8. See supra note 5, at 34.
9. For commentary on the Act generally, see Kahale and Vega, Immunity and
Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT' 1. L. 211 (1979); Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice,73 A.J.I.L. 200 (1979); Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States ForeignSovereign Immunities
Act in Practice, 33 SOUTHW. L. J. 1007 (1979).
10. Recent Developments in the Anglo-American Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 5 INT. TRADE L. J. 298 (1980).
11. Norton and Collins, Reflections on the IranianHostage Settlement, 67 AM. BAR
Assoc. J. 428 (1981).
12. Proch Nau, The Hostages are Free, The Wash. Post, January 21, 1981, § A, at
6.
13. Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383,
396 (D. N.J., July 24, 1979). In another case Judge Hart followed the same analysis in
less detail. American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F.
Supp. 522 (D. D.C., July 10, 1980).

THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
were shipped to Behring, who often paid freight charges. At the Behring
warehouse these goods were loaded on pallets suitable for air shipment.
These pallets were moved to airports and met by planes sent by the Iranian
Air Force to pick up the goods. Behring sued the Iranian Air Force and other
Iranian government agencies in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey alleging that the defendants owed it almost $400,000 for services
rendered, and asking pre-judgment attachment of the property of the
4
defendants in the Behring warehouse.1
The defendant answered: (1) that it had immunity from personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA as a military activity of a foreign sovereign; and,
(2) that it was immune from pre-judgment attachment.15 The defendant failed
to produce any proof of the military character of the property.
Under the FSIA, a foreign state shall not be innume to personal
jurisdiction in any case in which the action is based on a commercial activity
carried on in the United States." The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by the nature of the course of conduct rather than by
reference to its purpose." Judge Fisher found that the Iranian Air Force was
conducting a commercial activity as a transporter of goods and not as a
uniquely military activity. Thus, the defendants lost any immunity to
personal jurisdiction."
The Treaty of Amity, etc., of 1955,20 between the United States and Iran

predates the FSIA and thus survives the FSIA.2' The court found that the

14. 475 F. Supp. at 386.
15. 475 F. Supp. at 388 n. 9. The FSIA provides that the property of a foreign state
shall be immune from attachment if the property is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a military activity and (A) is of a military character or (B) is under the
control of a military authority. See supra note 7, at § 1611(b)(2)(A,B). The defendant
also cited to § 1610(d), which provides that the property of a foreign state shall not be
immune to pre-judgment attachment if (1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its
immunity and (2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment
that might ultimately be entered against the foreign state and not to obtain jurisdiction. The defendant is thus denying any waiver. In § 1609 there is a prohibition against
attaching the property of a foreign state except as provided in §§ 1610 and 1611 or by
treaty in force at the enactment of the FSIA.
16. 475 F. Supp. at 388 n. 9.
17. See supra note 7, at § 1605(a)(2).
18. Id. at 1603(d).
19. 475 F. Supp. at 390.
20. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the United
States of America and Iran, 1955 (1957], 8 U.S.T. 899 (Aug. 15, 1955), T.I.A.S. No.
3853.
21. The FSIA provides at 28 U.S.C. § 1604 that treaties in force before the FSIA,

which provide other than in the FSIA, shall survive the FSIA.
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government of Iran explicitly waived immunity to personal jurisdiction
because of its signature on the Treaty."
The court next considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to the
pre-judgment attachment of the Iranian property he sought. 3 Judge Fisher
found that although the FSIA provided for attachment in aid of execution, or
from execution, upon a judgment, the Act did not provide for pre-judgment
attachment unless the foreign state gave an explicit waiver. The court ruled
that the Treaty does not constitute the explicit waiver of immunity from
pre-judgment attachment Congress clearly intended. 5
However, the court reasoned that, since the Treaty survived the
enactment of the FSIA,26 and since the FSIA is not a statute governing
construction of prior treaties, ordinary principles of construction could be
applied to construe the Treaty without reference to the FSIA? In the Treaty,
the party engaged in commercial activity in the other country waives for
itself and its property immunity from "suit, execution of judgment, or other
liability." The court found that the language "or other liability" shows that
the preceding language was used by way of illustration rather than by way of
limitation, and from other words of the Treaty that the parties intended to be
9
treated as ordinary private parties in each other's courts'
Judge Fisher concluded that the Treaty of Amity authorizes prejudgment attachment on the defendants' property 3Oand subsequently ordered
such attachment.2 1

22. 475 F. Supp. at 390 The relevant passage of the Treaty is:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations, associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly own or
controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping and other business activities within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or
enjoy, either for itself or its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgement or other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein. 8 U.S.T. at 909.
23. 475 F. Supp. at 391.
24. Id. at 393.
25. Id. at 394.
26. 28 U.S.C. at § 1604.
27. 475 F. Supp. at 394.
28. See supra note 22.
29. 475 F. Supp. at 395.
30. Id. at 395.
31. Id. at 396.
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The Reading & Bates Case"
Reading & Bates Corporation sued the National Iranian Oil Company in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging the
conversion of an oil drilling rig in Iran and seeking pre-judgment attachment
of funds in New York banks to the extent of $26 million. The attachment was
sought on the funds at twenty-nine banks. One bank indicated it had no
funds of the defendant. Four banks indicated they had funds of the defendant
in excess of $26 million. By stipulation the parties and the banks agreed to
set aside a special fund of $26 million at one bank in lieu of the levy on the
twenty-nine banks. Under New York Civil Practice Law' the plaintiff was
required to obtain a confirmation of the attachment within five days.4
Judge Duffy found that although the defendant might be proven to be in
violation of some terms of the charter of the oil rig, the plaintiff had failed to
offer proof that the defendant did not have a right to possess the rig under
the charter. 35 Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff had not
established sufficient insecurity of enforcement of a potential judgment
against the defendant as required by New York Civil Practice Law.' Since
the defendant had $700 million on deposit in New York, Judge Duffy found it
"simply too remote" to believe the defendant would remove all these funds."
The pre-judgment attachment was removed.3
.
Although Judge Duffy conceded that he need not consider the defendant's claim of immunity from pre-judgment attachment to reach his
decision, he nevertheless proceeded to dispute with Judge Fisher the proper
39
interpretation of the Treaty of Amity consistent with the FSIA.
First, Judge Duffy argued that, in light of the distinctions between
pre-judgment and post-judgment attachments drawn by the Congress in the
FSIA, a waiver of immunity to pre-judgment immunity should not be implied
lightly."0 Although he conceded that the interpretation of the FSIA would not
be binding on the construction of the Treaty of Amity, Judge Duffy argued

32. Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.
N.Y., Sept. 27, 1979).
33. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 6211(b) (McKinney).
34. 478 F. Supp. at 726.
35. 478 F. Supp. at 727.
36. Id. at 727.
37. Id. at 727. In a footnote the court declined to take judicial notice of the political turmoil in Iran.
38. Id. at 729.
39. Id. at 727.
40. Id. at 728.
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that consistent policy requires that waiver of immunity to pre-judgment
attachment should be explicit whether by statute or treaty. Moreover, Judge
Duffy, in considering the intent of the parties, found that a sovereign state
would clearly not subject itself to pre-judgment attachment since the state
would not evade a lawful judgment arising out of its commercial activities.'
The Hostage Crisis
Subsequent to the issuance of these opinions and before the issuance of
the next opinion considered below, the hostages were seized. President Carter
ordered the blocking of Iranian assets and the United States broke diplomatic
42
relations with Iran.
The E-Systems Case43
E-Systems, Inc. sued the government of Iran in the U.S. Court for the
Northern District of Texas for failure to pay on a contract to modify two
aircraft and for wrongfully demanding payment on letters of credit.44 The
plaintiff had previously sought and obtained pre-judgment attachment
against the aircraft and sought further pre-judgment attachment against a
blocked account for $4.4 million. 5
E-Systems, Inc. had given its guarantee of performance by letters of
credit on the Bank of America. The Iranian government demanded payment
of $4.4 million on the letters of credit. E-Systems, Inc. would have been
obliged to reimburse the Bank of America. Under the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, the Bank notified the corporation, which then applied for and
received a license from the U.S. Treasury Department to establish on its
books a blocked account. Judge Higgenbotham held that the blocked account
constituted only a debt and was not sufficient property upon which to grant
the pre-judgment attachment."6
The court additionally considered whether any of the property of the
defendant could be subjected to pre-judgment attachment. Judge Higgenbotham agreed with Judge Duffy that a waiver of immunity to pre-judgment

41. Id. at 729.
42. See supra note 11.
43. E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex., June
19, 1980).
44. A letter of credit is an engagement made by a bank that the issuer will honor
demands for payment upon the conditions specified in the letter.
45. 491 F. Supp. at 1296. A blocked account is a bank account frozen under the
Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 535 (1979).
46. 491 F. Supp. at 1299.-
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attachment should not be implied lightly from the Treaty of Amity. 7
Whereas, Judge Fisher tried to find the intent of the parties within the four
corners of the Treaty, Judge Higgenbotham looked at practice at the time the
Treaty was signed." In 1955, attachment of a foreign sovereign's assets would
not have been allowed. 9 Not until 1959 did the State Department permit
pre-judgnent attachment for the sake of gaining jurisdiction in quasi-in-rem
actions.-' The court would not unreasonably infer from imprecise language
that the signtories to the Treaty of Amity intended to burden each other with
a pre-judgment attachment liability so far from custom and practice." Judge
Higgenbotham concluded that there can be no pre-judgment attachment
under either the FSIA or the Treaty of Amity."
Under the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, the Treasury Department
authorized the courts to make pre-judgment attachments." Judge Higgenbotham interpreted the regulations as being based on the mistaken belief
that pre-judgment attachments were available before adoption of the
regulations.' Since the authority of the Treasury Department to abrogate the
existing law of pre-judgment attachment of assets of foreign countries was
not without question,' the court dissolved the writ of attachment against the
aircraft." In a footnote, 5 Judge Higgenbotham assumed without deciding
that the regulations could displace the act as a result of the President having
delegated his sweeping powers under the Emergency Economic Powers Act."
Motion for Consolidation
On March 5, 1980, the Islamic Republic of Iran asked the Judicial Panel
of Multidistrict Litigation for an order transferring related Iranian actions
for consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings. 9 On May 7, 1980, the

47. Id. at 1300.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Del Bianco, Execution and Attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUE. ORD. 109, 112, 113, n. 107 (1978).
51. 491 F. Supp. at 1300.
52. Id. at 1302.
53. See supra note 45.
54. 491 F. Supp. at 1303.
55. Id. at 1303.
56. Id. at 1304.
57. Id. at 1302, n. 14.
58. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (Dec.
28, 1977) [hereinafter IEPPA].
59. In accordance with Judicaiary and Judicial Procedure: Multidistrict Legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1968).
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Panel denied the transfer but stated that its order was without prejudice to
the right of any party to move for transfer of any subgroup of those denied.
Iran made a further motion for transfer of cases later that month.
Ultimately, ninety-six cases were consolidated under Judge Duffy in the case
discussed below. 6°
6

The Ninety-six Cases '

Ninety-six of the approximately four hundred cases against Iran were
brought before Judge Duffy for a ruling on the validity of pre-judgment
attachment of property of a foreign sovereign. Judge Duffy had previously
written dictum 2 which revealed his view that the Treaty and the FSIA did
not permit pre-judgment attachment against the assets of Iran.
On November 14, 1979, President Carter issued an order blocking
Iranian government property 63 under the authority of the Emergency
Economic Powers Act.' Judge Duffy held that whatever immunity to
pre-judgment attachment existed before the blocking order was unequivocably suspended by the President.6 5 The pre-judgment attachments in the
ninety-six cases were allowed to stand.
In a later opinion, Judge Duffy stated that, since the government had
granted, by Executive Order, 66 a license to the plaintiffs to bring suit and to
the courts to order pre-judgment attachment on Iranian assets, any demand
for a stay of the proceedings by the government was inappropriate. 7 The
levies of the court against the assets of Iran had vested in the plaintiffs
property rights which could only be cancelled by the government after due

60. Another important opinion on an Iranian case after the E-Systems opinion,
supra, was American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522
(D. D.C., July 10, 1980) in which Judge Hart granted partial summary judgment
against Iran. For commentary, see Gordon, The Blocking of Iranian Assets, 14 INT'L.
LAWYER, 659 (1980).
61. New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Company, 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 26, 1980). For an illustration of
the difficulties of serving process on the Iranian agencies during the crisis see the
earlier ruling in this case, see New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power
Generation and Transmission Company, 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. N.Y., 1980).
62. See supra note 32.
63. Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Nov. 14,
1979).
64. See supra note 58.
65. 502 F. Supp. at 132.
66. See supra note 63.
67. New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Company, 508 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. N.Y., 1980).
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process was given.6 The same executive department which granted the
license could suspend the license for a reasonable period without depriving
plaintiffs of their property rights. 9
0
The National Airmotive Case"

In this case, Judge Greene followed the reasoning of Judge Duffy in the
Ninety-six cases, supra, regarding pre-judgment attachment, the court also
considered a United States government motion for an indefinite stay." The
government appeals to the court to exercise its equitable powers because of
2
"the foreign policy implications of further proceedings."
The government argued that the crisis would prevent the presentation of
its views on the sovereign immunity defense asserted by Iran." The court
found there was no pressing need for these views after the enactment of the
FSIA.74 "A primary purpose of that Act was to depoliticize sovereign
immunity decisions by transferring them from the executive to the judicial
branch of government, thereby assuring litigants that such decisions would
be made on legal rather than political grounds."75
The heart of the government's argument was that the Iranian assets
were a bargaining chip in negotiating with Iran to end the crisis." The court
found these arguments too open-ended both as to substance and duration."
Judge Greene expressed the view that the immobilization of the courts
through an indefinite stay would add the American system of law and justice
to the hostage rolls."9 Since the Treasury Regulations prevented actual
transfer of funds, there could be no loss of the bargaining chip; moreover, the
United States retained the option of spending tax funds in pursuit of its
foreign policy objectives. 9 The court weighed these considerations against the
interests of the plaintiff in vindicating its claim against property located on

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. National Airmotive v. Government and State of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.
D.C., 1980).
71. Id. at 403.
72. Id. at 403. The court noted that the government has made similar plans in
other private actions against Iran.
73. Id. at 406.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 406, n. 11.
79. Id. at 406, n. 10.
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American soil, a right stemming from Article III of the Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment,80 and found an indefinite stay could not be justified. The
court granted a seventy day stay."
dames & Moore v. Regan82

As the spring of 1981 passed, litigation on the prejudgment attachments
continued through appeals in several circuits. 3 Dames & Moore had won a
summary judgment against Iran but the court stayed execution of judgment
pending appeal.84 It also vacated the pre-judgment attachments against
Iranian assets. Dames & Moore then filed suit in District Court against the
Secretary of the Treasury seeking to block enforcement of the Executive
Orders and Regulations. 5 The District Court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dames & Moore
filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
Supreme Court recognized that time was running out for the petitioners and
the government, and on June 11, 1981 granted certioraribefore judgment,88
the first such emergency action since the Nixon case.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the President had the authority
under IEPPA to issue the order freezing the assets, to license the plaintiffs to
seek attachments, to void the licenses, to void the attachments and to order
the assets transferred out of the country. Although the Court tried to rest its
decision affirming the District Court on the narrowest possible ground, the
implications upon the other suits against Iran are unavoidable.
80. Id. at 406.
81. Id. at 407.
82. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4969 (July 2, 1981).
83. Prior to this ruling only the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and
District of Columbia Circuits had ruled on appeals. In both circuits the courts ruled
that the Presient had the authority to issue the challenged Executive Orders and
regulation. Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc. v. Khuzhestan Water and Power
Authority No. 80-1027; No. 80-1176; Nos. 81-1251, 81-1252 (1st Cir., May 22, 1981)
American Int'l. Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. Nos. 80-1779 and 80-1891; Nos.
80-2541, 80-2542 and 80-2543 (D.C. Cir., May 22, 1981).
of Columbia. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469, 471 (1947).
84. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. 79-04918 (C.D.
(C.D. Cal).
85. Executive Orders No. 12276-12285; 46 Fed. Reg. 7916-7932; EO. No. 12294,
46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981). Of the numerous regulations the most crucial to this case
were the regulations of June 4, 1981, 31 CFR 535, 46 Fed. Reg. 30340, which ordered
banks holding Iranian funds to transfer these to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York on or before noon E.D.T. June 19, 1981.
86. 49 U.S.L.W. 3928 (June 11, 1981). Subsequent orders accepted unnumerous
parties as amicus curiae and granted two hours for arguments. 49 U.S.L.W. 3953. Oral
arguments were heard June 24, 1981 and the opinion was issued nine days later.
87. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 603 (1974).
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, found that the plaintiffs
interest in the attachment was conditional and revocable and, as such, the
President's actions did not effect a taking of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The Court pointed out that the petitioner was receiving
something in return for the suspension of his claims in United States Courts,
namely the opportunity to try the case before the Claims Tribunal. Although
further consideration of the claim of taking of property was held not to be
ripe, the Court went on to point out that the petitioner could sue the United
States in the Court of Claims.
The opinion emphasized the traditional power of the executive branch to
handle foreign affairs and to settle claims of United States citizens against
foreign countries, and emphasized the very broad grant of powers by
Congress to the President in IEPPA as an indication of Congressional intent,
and pointed out previous claims settlements which did not need the
ratification of Congress.
Because of jurisdictional and procedural impediments in United States
courts, some claimants may do better before the Claims Tribunal. The
claimants may well get even in the long run.8"
Conclusions:
The Iranian assets litigation before the hostage crisis presented certain
issued of law which would have been worked out in the normal course of
judicial events in the absence of that crisis. The hostage crisis caused a chain
of events including the issuance of the Executive Order freezing the Iranian
assets, the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, the agreements with Iran and
the Executive Order implementing those agreements. These events proceeded
at a pace slow enough to entangle the courts, but too quickly for definitive
appellate opinions on the legal issues.
The pre-judgment attachments probably would not have been granted if
it were not for the regulations which seemed to grant such authority to the
courts. To have the Treasury Department issue regulations granting
authority to the courts on one hand and to have the State Department
pleading, for the sake of the hostages, for the court not to use such authority
was debilitating on the court system. It is no wonder Judge Greene felt the
court system was being held hostage.

88. Nickel, The Iran Deal Doesn't Look Bad, Fortune, p. 57, February 23, 1981.
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The Iranian Hostage Crisis was an event unique in history; perhaps the
State Department and the United States courts will never have to face
another such crisis again. If there is ever a comparable crisis the Departments of State and Treasury will be better able to foresee the impact of
foreign assets control regulations on the courts.
Kenneth L. Warsh

